Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1989

Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on
Rubin
Peter L. Strauss
Columbia Law School, strauss@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Legislation Commons, Rule of Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States
Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427
(1989).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/210

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

LEGISLATIVE THEORY AND THE RULE OF LAW:
SOME COMMENTS ON RUBIN
Peter L. Strauss*
Professor Rubin's article is an admirable piece of work on many
levels, from its attention to jurisprudence to its concern with the practical changes in the Congress and its function, and their implications. In
commenting on it, I mean to restrict myself to the latter subjects.
These are the matters that have the closest tangency to my own work
and produce for me the strongest response. Professor Rubin has given
us a compelling statement of the problems posed for contemporary
constitutional and legislative theory by one transformation in statutory
practice accompanying the rise of the administrative state, the change
from direct ("transitive") legislative resolution of policy problems to
indirect ("intransitive") resolution through the empowerment of agents
who are to determine policy problems under instruction. These
changes, he argues, undercut such conventional doctrinal norms as
"delegation" and "void-for-vagueness" as means for assessing legislative action.
One encounters the changes Professor Rubin describes on every
hand. They are almost certainly irreversible, given the increasingly
complex and interdependent ways in which we understand our existence. As a description of changes and as an assessment of the corresponding inadequacies of our existing models and theories about
legislation, his essay is compelling. What a commentary might hope to
do is to suggest a series of next steps in the analysis, further questions
that might be asked as we seek to develop the new body of legislative
theory for which he calls.
For this reader, at least, not all of Professor Rubin's suggestions
about future directions are equally as compelling as his assessment of
the current situation. This is in part because of the need to develop a
sharper picture than he gives us of just who the actors really are that
count in a world of intransitive legislation-not just elected politicians,
but increasingly a body of staff who have substantial room to act on
their own initiative. And it is in part because of a failure to see that
once the conversion has been made from "transitive" to "intransitive"
statute-making, the theoretical question requires looking more broadly
at government-as-a-whole. It becomes then a question about controland that question is not only one about Congress's relation to the agencies (the question on which he would have us focus), but also about the
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
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people's relationship to both Congress and the agencies; and also
about our relationship to the President, and the President's relationship to the agencies. This is, if you like, the separation-of-powers question; one needs to account for the President and the courts as well as
the Congress, and for the impact of change in Congress on how we
would wish Congress (and our government generally) to be.1
It may be useful to begin with a concrete example of the change to
which Professor Rubin calls our attention. His examples, understandably enough in terms of his own career, are drawn from banking regulation; perhaps a more fully developed example from another area of law
will illustrate the principal observation on which his paper is based.
The example will also develop background for later development of
questions about the completeness of his analysis and suggestions for its
further development.
Railroads constituted a major source of social cost in late 19th century America, as well as a major element in the economy. 2 The failure
of the railroads to purchase effective and available safety technology for
their locomotives and freight cars and to implement standards of compatibility among them had contributed substantially to a staggeringly
hazardous industrial setting: over twenty thousand workers were being
injured annually, and over two thousand killed, in accidents that were
largely avoidable. The common law contributed little impetus to
changing these results; "assumption of the risk," "contributory negligence" and the "fellow servant" doctrine impeded workers' lawsuits.
Even in the absence of these elements a railroad would not be found to
have been negligent for providing equipment less safe than it might be,
if it had provided its workers with the equipment in common use at the
time. The hazards of the workplace, as it ordinarily was, provided the
ground against which possible common-law liability was to be assessed.
Congress enacted the Federal Railway Safety Appliances Act of
1.
In this century, the nexus of policy making has largely shifted from the constitutionally designated branches of government to the bureaucracy: the system
of shared powers created by the Constitution has become a system of shared
influence over bureaucratic decision making. Each branch of government possesses many tools with which to influence the bureaucracy; both Congress and
the president attempt to design institutional arrangements to effectively oversee and control bureaucratic decision making. These institutional arrangements channel and constrain policy making within the bureaucracy.
Congress: Structure and Policy 403 (M. McCubbins & T. Sullivan eds. 1987).
2. The two paragraphs following draw on materials concerning the development
and implementation of the Federal Railway Safety Appliances Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 531
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1982)), collected in P. Strauss, Materials for
a Course in Legal Methods 106-248 (prov. ed. 1988). See, in particular, Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 238 (1893); H. Rep. No. 1678, 52d Cong., Ist Sess. (1892); 24 Cong.
Rec. 1246-51, 1273-88, 1323-33, 1370-76, 1416-18 (1893); L. Friedman, A History of
American Law 482-84 (2d ed. 1985).
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18933 with the avowed purpose of forcing use of the new and safer
technologies. Although, atypically for its time, the statute delegated
limited functions to an administrative agency (the Interstate Commerce
Commission), it was predominantly "transitive" in character. It told
the railroads just what technologies they were to employ (power brakes,
automatic couplers, "grab bars," and coupling equipment whose height
would not vary from standard whether the cars were loaded or empty),
and declared the sanctions that were to apply in the event of failure.
While the ICC was permitted to make certain interim decisionswhether to postpone the effective date of a standard, whether to recommend a prosecution to the Attorney General-Congress generally
placed enforcement power in the hands of the prosecutors and the
courts. With a trivial exception, 4 no standard remained to be developed at a later time or by another authority. One reading the congressional debates is immediately gripped by a sense, not only of their
seriousness of purpose and genuineness as debates, but also of their
sharp focus on precise definition of the appropriate legal response to
the problem at hand. That was Congress's business.
By 1966, the automobile had displaced the railroad as mainstay of
the economy and major source of personal injury. Over fifty thousand
Americans were dying annually in automobile accidents, with enormous
additional losses in bodily injury and property damage.5 It was coming
to be widely believed that a substantial proportion of this carnage could
be avoided if only the automobile were as well equipped for safety in
collisions as it was for stylish appearance. Some suitable technologies,
like the seat belt, were available; others, it was confidently thought,
could quickly and easily be designed. Few consumers were ordering
such optional safety technologies as were available, and the automobile
manufacturers were expending little effort to develop new ones. Again,
the common law provided little in the way of incentive; in the fifty years
since the decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 6 automobile manufacturers had come to accept that they would be held to produce cars
that were free of defects and reasonably fit for their intended use as
3. 27 Stat. 531 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1982)).

4. The American Railway Association was given 90 days to reach an agreement
among its members setting the uniform height of the drawbars, and the Commission was
instructed to set the height if it failed to do so. Id. § 5 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 5
(1982)).
5. The two paragraphs following also draw on Strauss, supra note 2, at 503-727,

which discusses the development and implementation of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The interested reader should watch for

publication ofJ. Mashaw & D. Harfst, The Freedom Machine (forthcoming by Harvard
University Press), which tells the story of this legislation, in Congress and out, in its
rather unpleasant detail; a version has appeared as Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and
Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 Yale J. on Reg. 257 (1987).
6. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1051 (1916).

-
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automobiles; but they were not held to foresee that their products
would be involved in collisions, and thus the law was indifferent to their
failures to7 design their products for safe performance in the event of an
accident.
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,8 like
the Railway Safety Appliances Act of 1893, sought to force the development and deployment of safety technology. Congress was not prepared
to decide, however, what measures should be taken to render cars acceptably safe. It gave authority to an agency within the Department of
Commerce (soon to be transferred to the Department of Transportation) to decide, following rather elaborately stated procedures, what
safety standards would be "reasonable, practicable and appropriate for
the particular type of motor vehicle .. .for which it is prescribed,"
would "meet the need for motor vehicle safety" and could "be stated in
objective terms." 9
The contrast with the "transitive" Safety Appliances Act is striking.
The 1966 Congress, in the same legislative breath, decided far less for
itself and required its agency delegate to exercise much more detailed
choice and supervision over the automobile industry than the 1893
Congress had done concerning the railroads. And one reading the legislative history finds similar contrasts. The 1966 legislative process differed profoundly from that of 1893, both for institutional reasons and
in view of the changed nature of the legislative product. Used to leaving matters to its own growing bureaucracy and that of executive government, and consumed with the demands of overseeing both, the
1966 Congress had neither time nor inclination to attend to legislative
detail; there was no debate worthy of the name, just rhetoric about the
seriousness of the problem and the need, at last, to see that something
was done about it. This is, then, an excellent example of an "intransitive" statute.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL SIZE AS AN ADDED ELEMENT OF THE DESCRIPTION

Our understanding of the change would be considerably enriched,
and our perspective perhaps shifted, if we were to look as hard at
changes in Congress the institution as at changes in its work-product.
Professor Rubin indeed notes that the changes in legislative work7.
The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in
collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the
possibility ....[T]he defendant also knows that its automobiles may be driven
into bodies of water, but it is not suggested that defendant has a duty to equip
them with pontoons.Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966).
8. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1381-1431 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392(f)(3), 1391(2), 1392(a).
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product-intransitive rather than transitive statutes-may be owing not
only to changes in the nature of the problems having to be solved (their
added complexity and the like), but also to changes in the institution
producing them, Congress itself.10 Yet he does not ask whether the
latter changes give rise to difficulties of their own. He describes as "reforms" such alterations as "the increase in professional staff, the modification of the seniority system and the creation of congressional
agencies such as the Congressional Budget Office."'" In my judgment,
the "reform" characterization is not obvious; we need fuller analysis of
these changes before reaching prescriptive conclusions. Considering
political controls exercised by Congress as part of a new theory of intransitive legislation will require us to consider who will be exercising
those controls, in what circumstances, subject themselves to what oversight, and with what if any necessary connection to the views (various as
they will be in the usual situation) that underlay the legislation as a
whole.
One of the differences between the Congress of the transitive late19th century and the Congress of the intransitive present is the simple
fact of size. The Congress of that era had little in the way of professional staff;12 its members dealt with one another, and one may imagine
that that had a good deal to do with the transitivity of its output. The
debates over the Safety Appliances Act were debates among individuals
who had themselves studied the problem and come to conclusions, and
who were, transparently, reasoning with one another about the precise
shape of a desirable outcome. The Congress of today is a bureaucracy
of over twenty thousand' 3-many in agencies such as the Congressional Budget Office or the General Accounting Office of Bowsher v.
Synar14 fame, but thousands also in the offices of individual members
or on the staffs of congressional committees. The change reflects a dramatic alteration in the nature and possibilities of legislative function.
While "[h]aving a substantial number of staff people with appropriate
investigative authority seems a necessary condition for congressional
oversight of the executive branch and the independent regulatory commissions," writes M. Malbin, "there is a gloomier side: the effect of
staffs on Congress's ability to act as a deliberative body."' 5 Use of staff
marginalizes debate and discussion among elected representatives and
10. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 369,

396 (1989).
11. Id.
12. Polsby, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, 62 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 144, 158-60 (1968), reprinted in Congress: Structure and Policy, supra

note 1, at 91.
13. See infra note 16.
14. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
15. M. Malbin, Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of

Representative Government 240 (1980).
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introduces serious problems in information management and assessment. Nor has the use of staff
left the members with more time to concentrate on their legislative work ....

[W]hile representatives as recently as 1965

spent almost one full day every week on legislative research
and reading, by 1977 the time spent on reading was down to
an average of eleven minutes per day. In other words, instead

of freeing the members to concentrate, the staffs contribute to
the frenetic pace of congressional life that pulls members in
different directions, reduces the time available for joint deliberation, and makes concentration all but impossible.... The
situation feeds on itself. The members need staff because they
have so little time to concentrate, but the new work created by
the staff takes even more of the members' time, indirectly elevating the power of Washington
issue networks in which the
16
staffs play so prominent a role.
One must immediately concede that "the curse of bigness" is
hardly a problem for the Congress alone,' 7 and that it may be hard to
pin down propositions about cause and effect. Consider the following
possible accounts, which need not be taken as mutually exclusive. The
first is that the growth is the result of technological developments-as
simple as the availability of the jet plane and the evening television
news, and what they connote for congressional behavior: more frequent trips home; more visitors at the office; more emphasis on expo16. Id. at 242-44. A more recent assessment is no different:
In 1974, there were 16,000 people on House and Senate staffs at a cost of $328
million. Today, there are 20,000 at a cost of a shade less than $1 billion....
Why has Congress grown so much? Not because this is a bigger country, Since
1970, the population has increased by 7 percent; Congressional staffs have increased 43 percent. Not because the issues are more complex; they have always
been complex.
The fundamental reasons are the members' desire to make a mark, to get publicity and the need to raise campaign funds.
M. Gwirtzman, Far Too Many People on Capitol Hill, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1988, at A31,
col. 3. Mr. Gwirtzman notes that at last count there were more than 250 separate subcommittees-12 on the subject of international economics alone-and that "the present
average of 60 various hearings a day means some members are scheduled into three or
four at once, in addition to their other work." Id.
17. Respecting the Executive Branch see, e.g., H. Merry, Five-Branch Government:
The Full Measure of Constitutional Checks and Balances (1980); D. Price, America's
Unwritten Constitution: Science, Religion, and Political Responsibility (1983); B, Patterson, The Ring of Power: The White House Staff and its Expanding Role in Government (1988). Respecting the judiciary, see, e.g., R. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis
and Reform (1985); Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of
the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (1987). In addition, a Conference on the Presidency and the Press,
at Columbia University School of Law (Jan. 18, 1989), heard Hugh Sidey of Time Magazine ascribe much (unfavorable) change in the character of White House-press relations
to the growth of the White House press corps from a knowable few dozen to a wolf-pack
of 1400.
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sure to voters and personal celebrity rather than old-fashioned party
politics as the basis for a career. The second and related account, given
by public choice theorists, is that the behavior of members of Congress
is fundamentally to be understood in terms of the drive for reelectionreelection to be secured by increasing personal opportunities for
credit-taking (general, intransitive legislation of the do-somethingabout-this-problem type, or private casework for constituents) and
avoiding public resolution of difficult issues (transitive legislation).
Third (a competing political science vision), one could argue that state
actors wield (and hence seek to enlarge) power quite independent of
the electorate, an activity more likely to be successful if they have a
loyal apparatus to assist and if there exist opportunities for private, personal action than if they must act in a setting requiring public collaboration with others;' 8 thus, the internal congressional reforms of the
early 1970s-the replacement of powerful committee chairmen operating under seniority rules with much more dispersed authority structures-added to the need for staff and provided many more
opportunities for the exercise of essentially private power. A fourth,
and related, account would be that Congress's incentives and need for
staff have been influenced, if not distorted, by two decades, almost uninterrupted, of Republican Presidents and Democratic Congresses; the
truly massive growth in congressional staff of the early 1970s occurred
at the time of the budget and impoundment struggles between the Republican (Nixon) White House and Democratic Congress, which resulted in creation of the Congressional Budget Office and a massive
supplementary congressional budget operation.
Whichever of these explanations we choose to accept, or perhaps
others that could be imagined, we are left with the fact of a swollen staff
apparatus and, accordingly, significant issues of control. In effect, congressional process has itself become intransitive-members put more
effort into control and less into specification-and it has also become
fragmented and depersonalized. These changes, too, need to be considered in moving from a description of the need for a new theory to an
effort at formulation. They provide, if you like, possible reasons for an
"attitude of distrust about the modern legislative process"' 9 that are
quite contemporary and not at all linked to sentimental attachments to
the old. While it has always been hazardous to speak anthropomorphically of a legislature, as if it were a unified body capable of memory and
intention, those difficulties are compounded when personnel proliferate, responsibilities are spread, and concerted action is abandoned in
favor of individualized or even committee oversight. "The hazard is
that a body like Congress, when it gets into detail, ceases to be itself; it
18. E. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (1981).
19. Rubin, supra note 10, at 387.
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acts through a fraction which may be a faction." 2 0
Indeed, the enlargement of congressional staff could be seen as
contributing to the specificity of legislation, albeit a specificity that may
heighten factional dangers, as Congress struggles with the President
for political control of government. It has been frequently enough remarked that the statutes of the health and safety regulatory outpouring
of the 1960s and early 1970s were quite a bit more, not less, specific
than the economic regulatory statutes of the 1930s. Thus the 1977
amendments of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, reacting to apparent failures of administrative (executive) action, indicated in some detail the pollutants to be regulated and the deadlines to be met in doing
so. 2 1 The 1986 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act refer to a
table of contaminants the agency had published in the Federal Register
as part of an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, requiring the
agency to act on those contaminants within stated times and permitting
only limited substitutions. 22 After skimming the public laws enacted by
the first session of the 100th Congress-not a recommended activity-I
can report that virtually all laws enacted by that Congress were intransitive in Professor Rubin's sense; they assigned chores to one or another
Secretary or Commission. Yet scattered through their pages were provisions of striking specificity. Section 202(e) of the Water Quality Act
of 1987, a statute running 84 pages in Statutes at Large, provides that
"[t]he activated bio-filter feature of the project for treatment works of
the city of Little Falls, Minnesota, shall be deemed to be an innovative
wastewater process and technique for purposes of" federal grant support. 23 Without that provision, whether to qualify the bio-filter feature
would have been a matter for administrative detail. Similarly, the
twenty-three page National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of
1987 sets maximum permissible energy consumption levels for a variety of household appliances; 24 and the 130-page Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 specifies the rush
hour restrictions for a suburban Washington, D.C. highway. 25 Perhaps
especially striking in its implications for the contemporary uses of congressional staff is section 415(a) of the Competitive Equality Banking
Act of 1987, which provides that the Senate and House Banking Committees are each to "monitor and review" the informal review proceedings of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board when bank examiners'
20. Macmahon, Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the
Purse (pt. 2), 58 Pol. Sci. Q. 380, 414 (1943).
21. See the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(c), 7411(o (1) (1982) (specifying timetables and pollutant); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 131 I(b)(2)(c) (1982) (specifying
pollutants and time for action).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
23. Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 202(e), 101 Stat. 7, 16 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1282).
24. Pub. L. No. 100-12, § 325(a)-(i), 101 Stat. 103, 108-13 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 6295).
25. Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 147, 101 Stat. 132, 180-81.
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decisions about appraising
or classifying savings bank loans are called
26
into question there.
If this is a return toward transitivity, it is a return in a special sense,
made possible only by the enormous growth in congressional staff and
armed by politics. One need not see this as irresponsible; the staff have
bosses, and it is in their interest to find out what will satisfy those
bosses and then to bring about that state of affairs. 27 Yet it is also hard
to pretend that such matters reflect judgments of any members of Congress outside the responsible committee (or, perhaps, even the judgments of most within it), and the committee presents the factional
dangers already described. As between a judgment by that faction,
loosely responsible to the Congress as a whole, and an agency head
loosely responsible to the President, a contemporary theory of public
law free of the problems introduced by Republican presidencies and
Democratic legislatures might well prefer the latter. Whether the use
of staff is producing more low-level monitoring or quixotically precise
statutes, or both, the implications of its presence and behavior require
us to know a good deal more about the institution before we can decide
just what we want to do about it.28
To take one concrete example of a possible outcome of such analyses, consider the recent reawakening of respectability for arguments
that statutes ought to be interpreted on the basis of what they say, not
what their legislative history might appear to reveal. Over the years,
lawyerly and judicial debate about how best to interpret statutes has
been a compound of several elements-suspicion about what populist
legislation might do to the formal unity of the common law; concern to
suppress judicial subjectivity; doubt about the existence of shared congressional "intentions" on issues of meaning or, in any event, about the
possibility of accurately reconstructing them; the conviction that statutes in a democracy should be taken as a source of law superior to the
common law; the belief that attention to legislative history would, as an
exercise, tend to take judges outside themselves and closer to the popular will that statutes reflect. If, for a while following the New Deal,
these debates were moving toward closer consideration of legislative
materials-to the point even of excluding judges from a tradition of
being responsible as the general systematizers of law2 9- the recent sig26. Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 415(a), 101 Stat. 552, 622 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1437
(West Supp. 1988)).
27. Suppositions about the general effectiveness of such controls are at the root of
analyses such as Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast, A Theory of Political Control and
Agency Discretion (1987) (on file at Columbia Law Review).
28. See Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 Duke LJ. 389.

29. I take this to be the general point of the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940). The case has been
understood for generations as a watershed in statutory interpretation, but simplistically
described as marking the divide between unthinking "plain meaning" interpretation and
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nals are that recognition of the changes in congressional process are
moving the courts in very different directions.3 0
Members of Congress, their staffs, and those who try to influence
them appear to have noticed that congressional reports have their uses,
not only within Congress, but also after Congress has finished its work.
It is commonplace that seeing that congressional reports are influential
upon later events-especially so for intransitive statutes- politicians
wishing to shape those later events turn their attention to shaping the
congressional reports. Any reader of contemporary committee reports
must be struck by the frequency with which remarks such as "the Committee intends" are to be found.3 1 And any realistic reader understands that these remarks are ordinarily written by staff, often at the
behest of lobbyists, not by the members of Congress themselves.
Moreover, as prior discussion suggests, the proposition that reports are
read, rather than prepared for their possible impact upon later events,
is increasingly an amiable fiction-at least if the reader is supposed to
be the harried Senator, the person who actually casts a vote. The Senator has time only for a hasty conversation with an aide, who has no time
to explain details.
Does it then make sense to rely upon reports as significant indicators of the meaning of the legislation to which they refer? National
Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board3 2 is an
interpretation willing to attend the signals of congressional understanding to be found
in the legislative history. One seeing that the majority had among them barely ten years
of experience on the Court, and that the minority included in their number ChiefJustice
Hughes andJustice Stone, might think that the decisive proposition had more to do with
the distinctive issues of the New Deal. Stone, in particular, was-for his time-among
the strongest proponents of thoughtful statutory interpretation and the superior claim
of Congress, but he married that position to an understanding that the judge's role was
that of melding statute and case law into a unified whole. Stone, The Common Law in
the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12-16 (1936). It is that strong judicial role that
the New Deal characteristically distrusted and the American Trucking majority rejected, in
favor of a view that treated statutes as referenced to historical congressional understandings alone.
It is not hard to find in recent discussions of statutory interpretation-for example,
in Aleinikoff's contrast between "archaeological" and "nautical" styles of interpretation,
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 20, 21 (1988)-a
reawakening of that debate.
30. Perhaps the Republican-Democratic division between the White House and
Capitol Hill also plays a role here. While the Reagan administration was enthusiastic for
"original intent" in the constitutional context, one's impression is that its judges,
Republicans, have been leading the charge away from reliance on legislative historythat is to say, Democratic history. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 533, 544-52 (1983); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1026
(1989); Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 Duke LJ. 371,
377, 379; K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) (opinions of Kennedy
and Scalia, JJ.).
31. E.g., S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, 9, 13-15, reprinted in 1966
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2709, 2714-15, 2717, 2720-23.
32. 618 F.2d 819, 827-28, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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early example of a modem court troubled by this issue. The case involved the question whether a recently enacted statute permitted the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to exempt air cargo carriers from certain regulatory requirements. Statutory language strongly suggested
that it did. The only explanation of that language appeared in a conference report, which said that "the Managers [of the conference report]
do not contemplate that the Board will exempt carriers from the requirement... .,33 The D.C. Circuit put this legislative history aside in
the face of statutory language that it thought clearly authorized the
CAB's action. Its refusal to rely on the conference report struck a
broader note of skepticism about the uses and abuses of legislative history. "Courts in the past," the court observed,
have been able to rely on legislative history for important insights into congressional intent. Without implying that this is
no longer the case, we note that interest groups who fail to
persuade a majority of the Congress to accept particular statutory language often are able to have inserted in the legislative
history of the statute statements favorable to their position, in
the hope that they can persuade a court to construe the statutory language in light of these statements. This development
underscores the importance of following unambiguous statutory language absent clear contrary evidence of legislative
34
intent.
A different but equally important response to the problems produced by the size of the congressional enterprise as well as its intransitivity is found in the increasing willingness of the courts to acknowledge
that statutory texts lack fully determinate meaning. Perhaps especially
noteworthy is the following passage from Chevron U.S.A. v. NaturalResources Defense Council :5
In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests
and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves
reconciling conflicting policies. Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of
specificity presented by these cases. Perhapsthat body consciously
desired the Administratorto strike the balance at this level, thinking that
those with great expertise and chargedwith responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply
did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was
unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on
33. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 773, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 3396, 3399-400.
34. National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, 618 F.2d at 828; accord TVA v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 172-73, 184-93 (1978); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir.

1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
35. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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each side
decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the
36
agency.
The scenarios described (along with some others) are just those that
explain much legislative intransitivity.
The proposition about "tak[ing] their chances with the scheme devised by the agency" ought to caution against any universal rejection of
the worth of committee reports or other artifacts of legislative history
in the world of the intransitive statute and the swollen staff. Legislative
history speaks to the agency much more loudly than it does to the
court, which does not have to undergo continuing relationships of
oversight and budgetary dependency. A number of reasons may exist
for encouraging (or at least accepting as inevitable) its use at the agency
level. Courts have long recognized the "contemporaneous construction[s]" of statutes by those appointed to administer them as powerful
indicators of statutory meaning. 3 7 They have done so, in substantial
part, because of the agency's fuller and more accurate political sense of
the situation. Under intransitive statutes, for which the first reading of
a statute typically will not be a court's, one might think it better that this
political good sense be derived from signals sent in public-that is,
from committee reports however written-than from signals more privately conveyed. 38 The agency, if a participant in the drafting, may well
have tools to distinguish false from valid signals of full congressional
politics that a court would lack.
Any propositions about subsequent political controls by the legislature ought to give the most careful attention to the questions earlier
raised. The farther one moves from enactment, the harder it is to pretend either that Congress held an (inexplicit) view that the agency
could sense, or that the particular committee, member of Congress or
staffer communicating with an agency represents that view. For while
individual members responsible for oversight may have views on one or
more of the issues left open, the body did not; and the disjunction will
only get larger as the years go on and as oversight is exercised or structured by persons other than those entitled to vote on the floor.
One can make this point in a theoretical way connected with Professor Rubin's discussion of the principal/agent problem. He proceeds
as if there were only one such problem-that between Congress and its
agent, the agency. In fact, there are two principal/agent problems immediately at work, and others in the wings. Congress is also an agent of
the citizens; it is neither our only agent, nor our only agent in what
could be called a principal/agent relationship with the agencies. When
Rubin remarks that "the legislature may be better able to control an
36. Id. at 865 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
37. E.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315
(1933).
38. One cannot doubt that, for the reasons Professor Rubin describes, the signals
will be sent. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 394.
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administrative agency than to control itself,"3 9 he ought more properly
to say that Congress may be better able to control an administrative
agency than we can control Congress, and that suggests some additional difficulties to which a new theory of legislation must respond.
Indeed, putting the problem this way highlights both that Congress is
not our (the citizens') only agent, and that it is our agent for limited
purposes. That conclusion ought to underscore earlier observations
about presidential-congressional competition and sharply raise separation-of-powers issues. We ought not be talking only about the
Congress.
II.

THE PROPER FIELD OF DESCRIPTION

Professor Rubin's basic point might be restated as follows: our existing body of legislative theory, in assuming that legislatures will (and
should) act transitively, focuses on issues of specification-has the legislature been sufficiently precise? Has it permitted others to reach conclusions that ought to be made only by it? Once we admit that a
legislature may act intransitively-we can no longer hope to deny that
it may-tests of specificity lose their point; the issue on which theory
must now focus is that of control.
This analysis is persuasive. While I shall suggest later on that "delegation" and "void-for-vagueness" may have their continuing uses if
viewed from a slightly different angle, the observation that they are premised in the idea of legislation as transitive in character is apt. Yet th6
proposition that we ought now to be generating a legislative theory
premised on ideas of control might be thought to carry with it a change
in analytic and normative perspective for which Professor Rubin does
not account. Once control becomes the focal issue of theory, we notice
that the legislature is not the only part of government controlling; the
courts control and, within the more political realm, the President also
controls. 40 The growth of the administrative state has not been a function only of change in legislative function; as government has swelled
and its tasks proliferated, executive arrangements and our expectations
about them have changed as well; and so have the relations between
agencies and courts.
Surely it is enough, the reader may respond, to attend to the
changes on the legislative side. And for detailed attention, that may be
conceded. Yet any legislative theory we may have is necessarily to be
caught up in a more general theory of government-the more so given
the totemic quality of separation-of-powers considerations in the Amer39. Id.

40. More properly, the Presidency controls. Here, as with the Congress, interactions are managed by a bureaucracy itself under imperfect control, not by the President
himself. See, e.g., National Academy of Pub. Admin., Presidential Management of
Rulemaking in Regulatory Agencies (Jan. 1987); B. Patterson, supra note 17.
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ican context. Granted the importance of controlling agencies that have
been given important social responsibilities under intransitive statutory
instructions, that proposition only opens the question to what extent
that control should occur through the open, event-focused, and somewhat rationalistic techniques characteristic of the courts, and to what
extent through political processes. And then, if one decides that some
ongoing political controls are essential, as inevitably one would, the
further question arises how they ought to be distributed between President and Congress. That question requires some attention to the problem whether different executive and legislative roles can profitably be
imagined in an era when the top layers of government are characterized
more by control than performance; 4 1 and to how particular "control"
functions that might be envisioned for the legislature-say, the legislative veto-might affect its continuing performance of function, or its
relation with the President. These questions Professor Rubin elides;
yet they bear importantly on some aspects of his analysis.
To make the point concrete, consider the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Morrison v. Olson,42 the Independent Counsel litigation. The
case concerned a challenge, on separation-of-powers grounds, to an
"intransitive" statute enabling the appointment of prosecuting officials
more than usually independent of presidential direction. These officers
and such executive branch control processes over them as were permitted are also subject to greater than usual (but not much) congressional
oversight. The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court, next to unanimous, upheld the statute on the basis of an analysis far less formalistic
than that which had characterized the decisions in Chadha and Bowsher.
I imagine that Professor Rubin would think, as I do, that on this occasion the Court produced a correspondingly more satisfying analysis.
What ought to be noted, however, is that the analysis was not one
that gave up the game of distinguishing between President and Congress or that failed to recognize that some choices about political controls denied the President or reserved to the Congress produce
constitutional difficulty. The analytic questions for the Court included
such issues as whether the President's controls over special prosecutors, although diminished, remained sufficient to preserve (and avoid
impermissible interference with) the characteristic functions of his (the
President's) office; 43 whether the controls Congress had reserved for
itself were such as to exceed the characteristic functions of the legisla41. It is important to this line of reasoning to distinguish sharply between the President and the ordinary agencies of government, and note that, in the arena of domestic
regulation at least, the functions of the presidency also have become intransitive. His is
an office that guides, shapes, and controls; but decision and implementation, as with
Congress, are placed in the agencies themselves, not in his hands. See Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
Colum. L. Rev. 573, 587-95 (1984); supra note 40
42. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
43. Id. at 2621-22.
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and whether the result as a whole reflected an attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive
Branch. 45 That Congress might exercise political controls and attempt
to separate administration from executive politics to some extent was
not denied; but such political controls as Congress might exercise had
to be assessed in the context of a continuing distinction between executive and legislative activity, and in light of their impact on the President's characteristic role.
The presidency is missing from Professor Rubin's paper, and its
absence saps the force of the prescriptive analysis. A theory of legislation addressed to the problems of intransitivity ought to recognize the
existence and role of the President as our most powerful political actor,
both entitled to exercise his own characteristic oversight roles and protected from undue interference in those roles (or confusion about who
is playing them). Granted that intransitivity gives added dimension to
the problem of continuing political control, reasons of both constitutional and practical dimension may suggest placing some such controls
in the President's hands rather than the Congress's, or counsel at least
that some rough parity, some principle of nonexclusion, be observed
between them. That the President will be playing suggests, too, an additional element to the congressional dynamic-especially in these
times of split political responsibility for government; in creating an intransitive regime, Congress delivers substantial control to the President
and thus raises for itself the problem how it can disarm the lobbyists
who may be6 successful over there in defeating its own policy
4
preferences.
III. A

REASSESSMENT OF SOME ELEMENTS OF THE CRrrIQUE

Professor Rubin's observation that the delegation and void-forvagueness doctrines are rather beside the point as constraints for a
Congress producing intransitive legislation provides useful insight.
While one could cavil with the argument in some respects, 4 7 its conclusions are persuasive. It does not follow, however, that these ideas are
without continuing utility in the present era. Consideration of how
44. Id. at 2620-21.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., text following supra note 20.
47. Thus, the discussion at the theoretical level becomes more difficult once one
acknowledges that Congress is not the source of legislative authority but its recipientthat the original "delegation" of legislative authority occurs in the Constitution, from
the people to Congress. Drawing on the very understandings about general agency law
that Professor Rubin cites, supra note 10, at 389 n.66, John Locke argued, influentially
so far as the drafters of the Constitution were concerned, that such grants from the
people of legislative power were ones "only to make laws, and not to make legislators."
J. Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government § 141. That principle is, nonetheless,
one that "has fallen before the inexorable momentum of the administrative state."
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1983).
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these doctrines might operate as part of the necessary network of political and legal controls constraining agency activity might have suggested
that the ideas remain vital and helpful.
Regarding delegation, it may be useful to start with Professor
Rubin's observations that "the passage of legislation and the consequent authorization of a federal implementation mechanism is not only
an initial exercise of legislative power, but a framework in which that
power continues to be exercised," 48 , and that as a matter of general
constitutional principle, "all organs of government should be constrained by rules, and ... their obedience to those rules should be supervised by some formal or informal method." 4 9 These observations,
powerful as they are, open a series of questions to which the idea of
delegation has some relevance. They suggest that the quality of even
an intransitive statute as "framework" has significance, and that it
would be appropriate to focus attention on the behavior of the agency
as delegate to determine what does, and does not, serve to constrain.
Taken in conjunction, they suggest the appropriateness of considering
also the impact on Congress-an organ of government-of various
constraints on its behavior during the post-statutory period during
which "power continues to be exercised."
Thus, a different way to assess the failures or successes of the delegation doctrine might be to look at the behavior of government agencies in formulating and defending their work-product. Thousands of
government attorneys spend much of their time demonstrating in internal memoranda, and when relevant in opinions, rulemakings, and judicial briefs, the bases on which proposed official action can be thought
authorized (or not) by governing statutes. While these conclusions may
be given dispositive weight when statutes are acknowledged themselves
to provide no sharp resolution of the question raised, 50 the structure of
the argument, the behavior of formal justification, is itself important.
Government attorneys do not think it relevant ("safe" is perhaps a better term) to argue that, since a statute was imprecise or broadly
worded, the agency may do anything it pleases, or that a court or other
outside observer cannot competently tell whether it is or is not acting
within authority. They acknowledge the obligation to demonstrate authority-and with it, all the other issues about regularity that follow,
such as consistency with (or an explanation of departure from) prior
results, procedural correctness and the appropriate exercise of
judgment.
The delegation doctrine thus provides the impetus for agency concessions that the exercise of certain forms of discretion is subject to
review for "abuse." Even if we must acknowledge at the outset that the
48. Rubin, supra note 10, at 392.

49. Id. at 392 n.75.
50. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984).
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agency will often succeed injustifying its conduct, precisely because the
statutory formula is diffuse (very often deliberately) and agency discretion correspondingly large, the stance won-that the agency must be
prepared to justify its behavior to outside assessors in accordance with
principles of regularity and legality-is no trivial matter.5 1 The very
fact of confidence in the possibility of supervision, and the winning of
behavior from government that acknowledges its appropriateness and
inevitability, lies at the heart of a commitment to the rule of law. This
sense of delegation, which Professor Rubin identifies as constitutional
in character, 52 remains vital; that, it is not difficult to say, is what underlies the persistence ofA.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.53 The
regularity and accessibility that a government must promise in order to
remain "under law" were missing in that case; the government's behavior,54 Congress's generosity and the temper of the times conjoined to
rob the Court of the assurance it must ultimately have that it would be
able to say whether discretion conferred by law, but having to remain
subject to check, had been abused.
One might then ask whether this rule of law idea of delegation,
diffuse and difficult as it may be, provides any appropriate constraints
over Congress. Direct control over the necessary specificity of legislative action is not the only possibility in this regard. One can imagine,
also, constraints whose tendency might be thought to induce Congress
to make as many choices in advance as reasonably possible, or to reduce the chance of undesirable (because private, or distorting of public
agendas, or the like) "controls" exercised after initial establishment of
the legislative framework. To acknowledge that statutes may be intransitive, providing a framework for continuing interaction rather than a
present resolution of policy issues, ought to heighten concern over just
what the postenactment behaviors of members of Congress might be
and how the possibility of their continuing control might feed back on
51. For this reason, Professor Rubin appears to move too quickly from the proposition that courts no longer enjoy full interpretive control over statutory content, emphasized by the decision in Chevron, see supra note 36 and accompanying text, to the
conclusion that they are "out of the loop." Rubin, supra note 10, at 396. The remaining judicial functions of boundary definition and regularity assurance, which he fairly
identifies, are significant and important ones; the governmental behaviors that facilitate
their exercise, as already suggested, seem the direct product of the "rule of law" aspect
of delegation.
52. Rubin, supra note 10, at 392 n.75.
53. 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (striking down code-making provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act as an "unconstitutional delegation of legislative power").
54. Compare Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), the other New Deal
delegation case, in which the government was compelled to acknowledge at oral argument that the standard at issue not only was never published, but, through a drafting
error, had in fact been vitiated-although it had still been relied on in the case. See
Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 561, 571 (1947);
Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev.
645, 658-60 (1946).
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the legislative process or disturb our general hopes for regularity in
government.
While Professor Rubin writes warmly of congressional oversight,
he does not yet seem to have addressed himself concertedly to these
issues. He limits the normative aspect of delegation as a "continuing
constraint on the legislature itself" 5 5 to its (outmoded) push toward
transitive legislative outcomes. He does not consider its tendency to
enforce the general allocations of responsibility suggested by separation-of-powers theory, to enhance openness in the exercise of governmental authority, or to control the supplanting of formal congressional
action by the "fraction which may be a faction." 5 6 Will oversight occur
as the result of efforts of individuals or strategically placed small
groups? It is then hard to ascribe to that oversight the political qualities of action by the legislature itself; the observation that "the legislature may be better able to control an administrative agency than to
control itself"' 57 is, in this respect, dangerously anthropomorphic.
Moreover, the easier it becomes for Congress, or persons in some
sense acting for it, to control agency behavior by other-than-legislative
means, the less incentive there is to precision in initial drafting. Even
conceding, as one must, that substantial intransitivity is inescapable in
the modern context, one may regard with suspicion approaches that
promise diminished congressional attention to its primary, public, legislative function in favor of other functions likely to prove both less
public and less responsible. The public-choice literature Professor
Rubin briefly discusses underscores these concerns, which will perhaps
become more accessible below where they are addressed in the specific
context of the legislative veto. 5 8
Similarly, one wishes Professor Rubin had looked beyond direct
application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to statutes, to the possibility of systemic application. He convincingly shows us that for intransitive statutes in themselves, the void-for-vagueness idea (which he takes
to represent Professor Lon Fuller's principles of morality in law) has
little utility. But Fuller formulated his principles, as Professor Rubin
recognizes, for "a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules," 59 and that suggests that their utility is not to be assessed
by looking at the legislative output alone. Professor Rubin's assertion
that "[w]hen [a] statute is enforced by an agency, our normative system
simply does not make the demands that Fuller perceives" 60 is correct
only with regard to the statute as subject, not with regard to the
broader system of which it is a part.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Rubin, supra note 10, at 393.
See MacMahon, supra note 20, at 414.
Rubin, supra note 10, at 394.
See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
Rubin, supra note 10, at 398 (emphasis added).
Id. at 399.
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Thus, vagueness or a lack of clarity in modem legislation is tolerated because it exists within a system that does give legal obligations or
restrictions more precise shape before the citizen is asked to act or subjected to penalties for unwanted behavior. The agency's development
and enunciation of administrative policy serves, in this respect, precisely the same function as does ajudicial "narrowing construction" in
conventional void-for-vagueness jurisprudence; it provides the requisite clarity and assurance of acceptable stability in results. Seen as an
obligation applicable to the system, embracing agency and Congress
together, the other elements of Fuller's analysis seem equally apt. In
using the term "law," he was not limiting himself to statutes; while it is
apt to say that he probably did not have the world of public administration in mind, he sought to describe the morality of a system, not its
particular elements. What Professor Rubin has done, then, is to indicate that the statute in isolation is not the appropriate focus of the
Fuller analysis; but he has not shown that analysis to be inappropriate
for the system as a whole.
Again, in formulating a theory of legislation that accepts as a starting point the appropriateness of substantial intransitivity by the
originating legislature, what one hopes to see is an account that considers the functioning of the system as a whole-that considers how particular approaches to the possible styles and varieties of legislative
action (here including postenactment oversight in all its forms) are
likely to contribute to or detract from both Congress's general performance of function in the constitutional framework we have and the
acceptability of that system's output as "law." To the extent Professor
Rubin's purpose is descriptive, to show that our present tools for controlling legislative behavior are inadequate to our present needs for
legislation, he has succeeded wonderfully, and the forgoing ought not
be taken as doubting that in the least. But he seems also to be thinking
about how things ought to be-what a replacement theory of legislation should look like-and here it seems to me that he and others building on his work must carry through on his insight. Precisely because
the new legislation is intransitive and interactive, a new theory of legislation must consider Congress and its functioning in systemic context.
How and with what resources it operates needs to be realistically considered, as must its relations with all the other actors of government.
What controls it is as important an inquiry as how it might control
others.
IV. AN EXAMPLE: THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
The example of the legislative veto illustrates all three themes of
these comments-the implications of Congress's bigness, the necessary
issues of presidential role, and the possibility that some aspects of delegation and void-for-vagueness will remain useful in an intransitive era.
Professor Rubin is persuasive that the formalist critique of the legisla-
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tive veto, based on presuppositions of transitive legislative action, is
weak. We should accept, also, his proposition that "one important
norm for the modern legislative process is that the legislature exercise
political control over administrative agencies. ' '6 1 The legislative veto is
one example of such a control-one that, indeed, he appears to favor.
Suppose we were to view the legislative veto, however, through a lens
accepting of the need for continuing political controls but concerned
nonetheless with the issues that have been raised: relationship to the
presidency; visibility and tendency to faction; and forward impact on
the functioning of Congress generally. Would we conclude that a modernist theory of legislation should entail the legislative veto, in one or
more of its several forms?
At the outset, we ought to define just which "legislative veto" we
are addressing. Historically, it came in many forms and was employed
in a variety of contexts, and the analysis suggested could vary among
them. Take two examples: A provision that independent regulatory
commission rules do not take effect if, within thirty legislative days of
their promulgation either branch of Congress has adopted a resolution
of disapproval; and a provision authorizing the President to reallocate
appropriated funds to a project otherwise prohibited by a budgetary
restriction if the relevant subcommittee does not object. The first of
these provisions is quite formal, requiring the whole of a chamber to
act in the public forum and reducing to that extent concerns about faction and responsibility; the action affected by the veto directly affects
the public; the President is at least arguably excluded from the oversight process, suggesting possible separation-of-powers concerns; a
veto, if exercised, will likely shape future agency action in other proceedings, without having changed any statutory provision; the very
prospect of a veto may chill agency action by increasing agency-staff
interactions;6 2 and the possibility of reserving a veto may influence how
diligently future Congresses perform their legislative function. The latter of these provisions is informal, reflecting a process that is likely to
occur in private and that will be influenced by only a few members; yet
the public is not directly affected; the President is a direct participant in
any dealings with the subcommittee and must concur for the change to
take place; and it is hard to imagine how a subcommittee's reserved
authority to permit reallocation would shape future behavior, detract
from presidential authority or discourage future congressional diligence. 6 3 The paragraphs following focus on the first form of legislative
61. Id. at 408.
62. See supra text accompanying note 26.
63. Appropriations are annual statutes, considerably more transitory than ordinary
statutes, but nonetheless binding on the executive. Their annual nature gives them,
from the beginning, more of a negotiated character. The form of restriction under discussion ("The Secretary may spend none of the funds hereby appropriated on [a described project] unless . .. ") reflects an initial stance of disapproval of the President's
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veto, although they include occasional comparisons with the second.
Such a veto was involved in Consumer Energy Council of America v.
FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission,64 one of two D.C. Circuit opinions
finding legislative veto provisions unconstitutional that were summarily
affirmed by the Supreme Court the week following its Chadha decision.
At issue was the House of Representatives' legislative veto of a rule
adopted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)under
the "incremental pricing" provisions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 (NGPA). 65 The NGPA had been enacted with difficulty during
the Carter Administration, with the closest controversy resolved in the
House (which eventually adopted the veto resolution) by only a single
vote. The controversy arose in substantial part, it appeared, because of
doubts about the incremental pricing policy (and the general deregulation of natural gas prices it represented). A legislative veto over certain
incremental pricing rules was seen as one of the elements necessary to
persuade a reluctant Congress to enact the bill. When FERC adopted
an incremental pricing rule in 1979 and sent it to Congress for possible
legislative veto, the debates revealed little doubt about whether the
agency had acted within its intended discretion under the Act; the sentiments predominantly expressed were that the Act itself had been a mistake, and so its implementation ought to be blocked by a legislative
veto. 66 Unlike the NGPA, the resolution permitted only a vote for or
against; it embodied no text to be debated, possibly amended, and put
into effect.
Running through the court's reasoning in disapproving the legislative veto in this case was a theme of relationship to the question of
delegation. Legislative vetoes that had been accepted by the Executive
even reluctantly- over reorganization acts, in the context of foreign affairs-had two characteristics, the court observed: they emphasized the
program that could otherwise be lifted only by statute. Deciding to permit the lifting of
such restrictions informally, it could be argued, enhances the overall flexibility of the
budgetary/appropriations process and weakens neither the President nor the Congress.
See Strauss, Was There A Baby in the Bath Water? A Comment on the Supreme Court's
Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 Duke LJ. 789, 812-17. Strikingly, legislative veto provisions of this character are still frequently enacted. Louis Fisher in an April 1987 report
for the Congressional Research Service, "Legislative Vetoes Enacted After Chadha,"
counted 102 legislative vetoes enacted after Chadha, virtually all of this type.
The appropriations context is, perhaps relatedly, one of extraordinary reliance on
legislative history enforced by politics. Appropriations statutes most often do not specify detailed spending directives; these directives appear in the committee reports. While
it has asserted its formal independence from these prescriptions, the White House has
generally gone along. Miller Acts to End Feud With Hill Over Funding, The Washington Post, July 12, 1988, at A21, col. 1.
64. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
65. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Star. 3351 (1978) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3342 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
66. 673 F.2d at 468-69.
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standardlessness of the original legislation, and they occurred in constitutional contexts in which such standardlessness might be of lesser concern. Government reorganizations do not directly affect private
persons; the President and Congress share the foreign affairs function
in complex ways; use of the veto device promotes flexibility without
threatening either executive or legislative function. The rulemaking
authority delegated to FERC, on the other hand, was authority directly
to govern the affairs of private individuals. To be valid, even under the
weak form in which "delegation" still survives, a statute had to promise
an administrative process that assured rulishness, against which the
conformity of agency action could be assessed. In effect, the courts had
to be in a position to assure themselves that however diffusely Congress
may have defined a reservation, there was a reservation off which the
agency was not to stray and the courts would be in a position to say on
the basis of reasoned analysis whether or not an agency had wandered.
"Arguments that Congress actually decided nothing whatsoever about
67
...incremental pricing" would raise "serious" delegation questions.
But the tendency of permitting a legislative veto would be precisely to
permit Congress to decide "nothing whatsoever;" the need to articulate standards would be all the less if, once an agency had attempted to
act, Congress had free and unreasoned opportunities to vote approval
or disapproval of the choices the agency had made.
This way of viewing the transaction also highlighted for the court
the manner in which the veto would work to undercut the general purpose of the Constitution's framers to make "the legislative power...
difficult to employ" 68 and their specific purpose to assure the President
an important role in the process. Congress might be encouraged to use
the legislative veto, not only because it makes its work easier (members
would then not have to work so hard to come to resolution as they
would on standards to be applied finally, with full legal effect, by
others), but also because it saps the President's veto. He might try to
block the initial decision of "nothing whatsoever," but if that failed he
would have no control over Congress's choice whether or not to block
agency action when the agency subsequently adopted a policy. Here is
a technique that, if permitted, could destroy the constitutional veto.
This impact was underscored by the consideration that the agency involved in the particular case, FERC, was an independent regulatory
commission, generally understood to be rather more removed from
presidential oversight and control than run-of-the-mill executive agencies. 69 "The fundamental justification for making agencies independent is that . . . political interference is undesirable. By then turning
around and asserting that this independence is a justification for the
one-house veto, Congress attempts simultaneously to decrease the
67. Id. at 467.
68. Id. at 464.
69. Id. at 470-479.
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power of the Executive and increase its own power. ' '7 °
Finally, the court looked explicitly at the issue of congressional
oversight.
When Congress conducts investigations or hearings, or enacts
a "report and wait" requirement, or threatens to reduce appropriations, or imposes reporting requirements, or engages
in other modes of oversight, its ability to influence the agency
derives almost entirely from its ability to pass a statute requiring a different agency action or reducing the agency's appropriations. These oversight methods enable Congress to
inquire "into past executive branch action in order to influence
future executive branch performance." [Under the legislative
veto,] Congress is able to expand its role from one of oversight, with an 7eye to legislative revision, to one of shared
administration. '
And, the court went on to note, it ought not be easily assumed that
Congress's power would be limited to the chamber acting. "The onehouse veto also increases sharply the negotiating power of individual
congressmen or committees in seeking to direct administrative outcomes." 72 That judgment is easily accepted and entails factional politics that are both uncontrolled (because likely private) and severe.
This last point, that legislative vetoes would enhance committee
power, suggests a connection to the problem of congressional size that
warrants equal concern. Here might be an impetus to further enlargement of the already swollen congressional bureaucracy. To be sure,
one might argue that legislative vetoes, if available, would displace (by
reducing the necessity for) other, more covert forms of oversight. Yet
in my judgment, particularly in the present context of Republican-Democrat struggles for control of the agencies from the White House and
Capitol Hill, the threat of a possible veto would arm more, not less,
covert activity. Political responsibility for committee communications
to the agencies would be at best problematic, with the problems being
resolved (to the extent they could be) by supervisory efforts on the part
of members of Congress that would necessarily subtract further from
the time available to them for directly legislative work. Given the private, bureaucratic, and fractional (likely factional) nature of those communications, and the unexplained nature of any resulting veto, any idea
that a legislative-veto regime would be constrained to the enforcement
of pre-existing congressional intentions about statutory meaning is chimerical. It would be an arena for current politics.
Even if one grants, then, that it may be necessary to set one bureaucracy to catch another, that the size of government generally beggars its direct control by elected individuals, one still must ask why that
70. Id. at 472.
71. Id. at 474 (footnotes omitted).
72. Id. at 475 n.213.

450

COLUMBIA L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 89:427

watchdog bureaucracy should be distributed among the politically fractured Congress, rather than placed in the politically unified office of the
President. 73 Coherence remains a desirable end in government,
whether Congress can supply it directly or must leave its working out to
others. The case that the 535 members of Congress, with their army of
more than twenty thousand bureaucrats, can supply that coherence by
oversight remains to be made.
Finally, consider what Professor Fuller's analysis might suggest
about whether a legislative-administrative system should include the legislative veto. Professor Rubin recognizes that that analysis may have a
good deal more to say to us about the desirable qualities of a system of
law than about the desirable qualities of statutes as such, and with that
judgment it is hard to disagree. He suggests that in general the system
of intransitive statutes supplemented by rules does meet Fuller's demands; one might add that that system without the legislative vetothat is to say, with the agency having authority to act pursuant to its
mandate, subject only to ordinary political and judicial controls-provides incentives for Congress to state the agency's authority, to the extent possible, in ways that also support them. How would adding the
veto change matters? One could believe that it would impair "generality" in two respects: by diminishing the need for initial standard-setting, it would reduce the rulishness of the initial legislative output; and
the arbitrary and unexplained character of legislative vetoes when exercised would frustrate any description of the overall system as operating
in terms of general rules. "Promulgation," making the law "readily
available," is similarly impaired: Congress has less reason to write statutes initially in a way that will make them accessible to the public; it is,
to that extent, able to operate in secret, without either revealing its policy choices or being bound to treat agency choices made under delegation in any coherent way. While delegation to agencies provides,
overall, a defensible means both for avoiding contradiction and impossibility and for securing constancy and congruence, the veto would undercut these qualities as well.
Is this the Congress we want-one with diminished incentives to
reach whateverjudgments might be possible on legislative issues, fewer
reasons to accommodate the President, enhanced capacities to disrupt
administration, and diminished political responsibility for the controls
those associated with it may exercise over government? Few would disagree with Professor Rubin that we must accept the intransitivity of
contemporary legislative action and seek a theory of legislation that will
acknowledge it. Congressional scholars have no difficulty in finding institutional incentives pointing strongly in-the direction of individual or
small-group casework, rather than the elusive business of coalition73. See, e.g., National Academy of Pub. Admin., supra note 40, at 23 (more appropriate congressional role is oversight of OMB).
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building, as the preferred congressional task. 74 The formulation of a
new theory might include, as one of its tasks, the possibility of institutional structures or demands that would push back toward collective
action. My concern is that, in pursuing that task, we do not abandon an
interest in having Congress function as a legislature, in preserving the
place of the President and (more broadly) what remains vital about our
notions of separation of powers, or in accommodating the impact of
bureaucraticization in government generally in ways that do not compound its problems.
CONCLUSION

Rubin succeeds in persuading us that the traditional equation of
"legislation" and "law" is problematic in the administrative state-that
legislation is more often concerned with the (other) organs of government from which "law" emerges than with its direct formulation. Yet
even if we accept this as a natural development, not a disease of which
the body politic should be purged, the relationships between those responsible for "legislation" and those responsible for "law" should be a
matter of active concern. Our wish for law, for conditions that will conduce to its creation, remains relevant to any theories we may hold for
legislation. If delegation and void-for-vagueness, for example, do not
serve well as direct measures of the worth or validity of legislative products, they continue to embody systemic values deserving of respect and
consequently influencing our notions of appropriate relations between
the legislative and law making efforts to the extent those are distinct.
An insight that properly turns our attention from performance to control needs to notice how various options on the placement or exercise
of control may affect the law-character of the system's ultimate output.
Congress is not the only institution controlling, and the new theory for
which Rubin calls must be concerned both with separation-of-powers
questions concerning the appropriate allocation of controls across the
whole of government, and the probable impact on Congress's legislating of the various kinds of controls that might be imagined. While today's theory of legislation must be differentiated from our theory of
law, one cannot free one from the other. Professor Rubin's analysis
pays insufficient heed to the continuing relationships.
74. R. Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (1978). See generally the essays collected in Parts I and IV of Congress: Structure and Policy, supra note

